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Abstract 
The scope of this paper is to assess the impact of competition on industrial toxic 
pollution by using for the first time, a panel threshold model which allows evaluating 
the main drivers of toxic releases under two different market regimes. The empirical 
analysis is based on a micro level panel data set over the five year-period 1987-2012. 
We show that this relationship is statistically significant and robust above and below 
the threshold, even after accounting for alternative specifications of market 
concentration. Finally, we unmask an inverted “V-shaped” relationship between 
market concentration and industrial pollution.  
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1.  Introduction  
 Manufacturing activities such as metal mining, electric power generation, oil 
refining, recycling, use chemicals to produce the products we consume (i.e 
pharmaceuticals, computers, paints, clothing, automobiles, etc). While the majority of 
toxic chemicals are managed by industrial facilities via strict regulations in order to 
minimize chemicals into the air, water and land, toxic releases do still occur as part of 
their everyday business operations (Levinson, 2015). To give but an example, of the 
scale of their use, it is worth mentioning that in 2015 and only for the US almost 3.36 
billion pounds of total chemical disposals (including on-site and off-site releases) 
were released many of them can be regarded as hazardous waste. Hopefully, nearly 26 
billion pounds covering approximately the 92% of total chemical waste (excluding 
metal mines), was not released into the atmosphere due to the use of preferred waste 
management practices such as recycling, energy recovery, and treatment (EPA, 2017). 
Based on the above considerations, it is common knowledge that industrial 
pollution affects the entire spectrum of the optimal use of natural and environmental 
resources to economic activity (Hsueh, 2015; Shapiro and Walker, 2015; Harrington 
et al, 2014; Bi and Khanna, 2012; Levinson, 2009). Over the last ten years researchers 
have tried to disentangle this relationship. Specifically, one strand of literature tries to 
explore possible linkages between the level of environmental pollution and serious 
health problems such as asthma, infant health and mortality, lung cancer, 
cardiovascular diseases (see for example Rzhetsky et al, 2014; Agarwal et al, 2010; 
Currie et al 2009; Currie and Schmieder, 2008). The second strand of literature, tries 
to investigate the possible spillover effects between environmental degradation and 
market structure (e.g. Simon and Prince, 2016; Branco and Villas-Boas, 2015; Fowlie, 
2009). It is well documented from prior theoretical studies that increased competition 
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in an industry may result in lower levels of production per facility not allowing 
pollution to grow (Farber and Martin, 1986). On the other hand, recent theoretical 
work claims that increased competition triggers the incentives of a firm to reduce 
costs in order to reduce its final prices and thus the pollution control activities 
(Shleifer, 2004). This strand is rapidly growing. Our approach is one of the very few 
attempts at modeling and estimating the decision of US firms on their participation 
using facility level data. For this reason, we formulate a number of research questions 
including inter alia the following: How does market concentration affect chemical 
releases? How does competition generate industry output and emissions? In what way 
the level of pollution is determined under different market regimes? Why does the 
level of industrial pollution is lower (higher) under the presence of (non)-competitive 
conditions in the market? Will more concentrated industries pollute more because of 
inefficiency driven by lack of technological innovation and limited competition or are 
they polluting more because of the correlation between market concentration and 
fixed costs. Lastly, what policy implications could be drawn in order to boost an 
efficient abatement mechanism? 
The main novelty of our study is that we use for the first time in the relevant 
literature a panel sample splitting methodology (threshold model) accounting for the 
decomposition of Significant Market Power (SMP) in an industry and linking the 
possible interactions with the level of industrial pollution.1 In this way, we argue that 
an industry needs to cross a certain level of market concentration (competition) in 
order to restrict environmental degradation. Explanations offered to account for this 
argument broadly fall into two categories. According to the first, it is the nature of 
data and differences in empirical methodology (i.e misspecification and measurement 
                                                   
1 In oligopolistic markets, SMP is evident in an industry/sector when prices exceed marginal cost (MC) 
and long run average cost (LAVC), so the firm makes positive economic profits. 
 4 
error, existence of outliers, lack of data quality, etc) justifying that the effect of 
competition on industrial pollution might be non-linear. But there is also an economic 
motivation emphasizing for this justification. More specifically, in oligopolistic 
sectors (i.e energy, steel industry, oil refining, cement industry, etc) which are 
characterised by high market concentration and absence of effective competition as a 
result of the existence of SMP by the incumbent, there are usually strict 
environmental regulations (i.e taxes, tariffs, fees, etc) in order to limit environmental 
degradation (Halkos and Papageorgiou, 2016). On the other hand, pollution (i.e toxic 
chemical releases) rises (falls) with an increase (decrease) of market concentration 
suggesting that environmental damage is more likely to evolve in oligopolistic sectors 
(Simon and Prince, 2016; Fowlie, 2009). Based on these justifications, we argue that 
competition might be different in the two regimes (concentrated and non-concentrated 
industries). In other words, instead of assuming a linear effect in which we attribute 
the full impact to one variable (i.e market concentration) we allow this effect to vary 
at different values of market structure.    
Our approach strongly accounts for the presence of cross section dependence 
while it utilizes “second-generation” panel unit root tests in order to uncover possible 
cointegrated relationships an issue that has been overlooked by the existing empirical 
literature. The reason for using this kind of unit root testing can be justified by the fact 
that traditional stationarity tests (known as “first-generation” tests) suffer from size 
distortions and the ignorance of cross section dependence (Pesaran 2015).  
The contribution of this paper is three-fold. First, it goes beyond the existing 
literature in that it uses a unique micro level dataset originated from thousands 
industrial facilities (polluters) dispersed among the 50 US states. This will help us to 
empirically explore the net effect of competition on facility-level emissions. Second, 
it utilizes a panel threshold approach with certain innovations such as the inclusion of 
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structural market characteristics and the treatment of a second threshold in the sample. 
This technique has been widely used by the literature to identify threshold effects 
when the variable of interest is observable, but the position of the threshold is not 
known. Third, and foremost, the paper unveils a stable non-linear inverted “V-shaped” 
relationship between market concentration and industrial pollution already hidden by 
the existing literature. Taken together, this set of findings is important in that it 
provides useful policy implications towards the abatement of toxic chemical releases 
in order to achieve sustainability.   
Using a panel threshold framework in the spirit of Hansen (2000), we show 
that the reason for the mixed evidence of the impact of competition on environmental 
degradation, (proxied by toxic chemical releases) in an industry lies with its level of 
market concentration. This implies that market structure cannot assert its role in the 
process of environmental pollution until an industry crosses a certain threshold level 
of concentration. Our findings remain robust across alternative market concentration 
measures (CR4 and HHI). However, the driving force that pushes competition to alter 
its behaviour toward the level of environmental pollution based on a specific 
threshold point (generating a “kinked” curve) provides an interesting opportunity for 
future theoretical and empirical research. 
The rest of the paper is as follows. Section 2 reviews the empirical literature. 
Section 3 describes the data and the relevant empirical testing for cross-section 
dependence and unit roots. Section 4 portrays the econometric methodology used in 
the empirical analysis. Section 5 discusses the empirical findings of the study, while 
Section 6 performs some necessary robustness checks. Lastly, Section 7 concludes the 
paper and provides some policy implications.  
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2.  Literature review   
There is a widespread belief that competition is regarded as a reliable 
mechanism for stimulating both allocative and technical efficiency (Leibenstein 
1966). As suggested by many researchers (Zhang et al, 2005; Zhang et al, 2008; 
Akkemik and Oguz, 2011), in a competitive market, prices and profits provide the 
firm with incentives to improve efficiency minimising costs. Further, competition in 
network industries such as electricity would deliver production and allocative 
efficiency, hence lower prices, or lower mark-up over costs (Fiorio and Florio, 2013; 
Chiara Del Bo and Florio, 2012). This will lead to higher industrial output, while 
lower per-unit costs resulting from increased technical efficiency may be passed 
through in lower prices, thus increasing the quantity demanded and subsequently the 
level of environmental pollution (Polemis and Stengos, 2016). Although the positive 
impacts of competition on total welfare are widely acknowledged by the economists 
the effect that competition has on environmental pollution is under scrutiny.  
Despite the profound interest by policy makers and government officials on 
the possible spillovers between market competition and environmental degradation 
the existing literature is still in its infancy, with controversial results. These can be 
justified by the fact that many researchers acknowledge that competition may have 
positive as well as negative effects on environmental pollution (Simon and Prince, 
2016; Branco and Villas-Boas, 2015; Fowlie, 2009; Mansur 2007; Shleifer, 2004).  
In a seminal theoretical paper, Farber and Martin (1986) argue that increased 
competition lowers industrial output, and thus, at least lowers average production per 
plant. Therefore, an increase in the environmental pollution along with the production 
expansion will create a positive effect on the environmental degradation resulting in 
less pollution per facility. Moreover, they posit that increased competition leads to 
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less abatement efforts by firms, since firms in more concentrated industries spend 
more on combating air and water pollution than firms in less concentrated industries.  
Subsequent work by Shleifer (2004) indicates that effective competition tends 
to increase the incentives of a firm to undercut costs in order to reduce prices. This 
can be broadly implemented to combating pollution in a sense that companies may 
pursue cost reducing strategies, by reducing pollution control activities.  
In another study, Fowlie (2009) develops a theoretical model for analyzing the 
rate of environmental emissions pass-through in tandem with certain welfare 
implications when effective competition is absent (unregulated industry). This paper 
highlights the role of market structure on determining the extent of emissions leakage 
by acclaiming that the more competitive the industry, the greater the effect of 
incomplete participation on industry emissions. Moreover, the study links the net 
welfare effects of pollution with the regulation-induced reallocation of production 
among heterogeneous producers. However more recent work (Branco and Villas-
Boas, 2015) tries to shed some light on the theoretical controversy between 
competition, abatement and pollution. Their main argument, documents that lower 
production reduces pollution while presumed lower abatement increases facility-level 
pollution. In other words, the net effect of an increase in competition on facility-level 
pollution is ambiguous. Cole at al (2013), use the toxic release inventory database for 
the period 1990 - 2005 to examine the relationship between ethnic divisions and US 
toxic releases neglecting totally the role of market structure. They argue that measures 
of ethnic divisions have a positive relationship with toxic releases. Similarly, Zwickl 
et al (2014), examine the spatial variation between racial and ethnic disparities in 
industrial air toxic releases in U.S. cities. They claim that the latter are strongest 
among regions with median income below 25,000 USD dollars. On the other hand, 
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their empirical findings support the argument that income-based disparities are 
stronger among regions with median incomes above that threshold.  
Lastly, in a similar to ours empirical study by Simon and Prince (2016), it is 
examined the role of market competition on controlling the level of industrial 
pollution in a form of toxic chemicals. They employ simple estimation techniques 
(OLS with fixed effects) using a micro panel dataset consisting of a small time period 
(five years from 1987 to 2007) and a large cross-section element (thousands of 
industrial facilities in the US). Their empirical findings indicate a robust linear 
scheme where competition is a stimulating mechanism achieving a reduced level of 
industrial pollution. In addition, they claim that competition increases abatement since 
the relevant estimate comes with a negative sign indicating that each percentage-point 
increase in the level of market concentration (proxied by Hirschman-Herfindahl 
Index) is associated with a 2.9% reduction in the abatement ratio. 
Based on the above, the existing studies do not properly incorporate the 
spillovers generated by the inclusion of competition on the pollution-abatement nexus 
since they totally neglect the notion of a sample splitting variable acting as a separator 
between two different market regimes (more competition vs less competition). Our 
model estimates an unknown threshold parameter in a data driven approach that 
“endogenously” sorts the data into the two different market regimes, whereby each 
regime would differ according to the prevailing attitudes of its members towards 
competition (Polemis and Stengos, 2017). The threshold variable that we use to sort 
observations is the level of concentration measured by well documented in the 
literature structural indices (CRn, and Hirschman-Herfindahl index or HHI).  
Subsequently, the sample facilities will be sorted according to the level of market 
concentration placing them into competitive (i.e taking low values of the index) and 
non-competitive (i.e. taking high values of the index). The purpose of this study is to 
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fill these research gaps by combining certain structural industry characteristics (i.e 
level of employment, capital intensity, market concentration, value added, etc) drawn 
from a micro economic perspective with the facility-level of toxic chemical releases.  
3.  Data and empirical testing  
The primary source for our data was drawn from the Toxics Release Inventory 
(TRI) which covers the period 1987-2015. The latter is a plant-level database that 
includes information about the industrial facility (e.g., name, state zip code, primary 
industry, etc), and releases of toxic chemicals to the air and water, as well as transfers 
to any kind of land disposal in the US territory. The reason for using industrial toxic 
chemical releases as a proxy for pollution and not the classical (global and local) 
pollutants such as CO2, NOX or SO2 is that the latter are only available at a state level. 
However, we argue that the empirical findings from the use of toxic chemicals can be 
easily extrapolated to other pollutants in a future research.  
The above information is submitted by U.S. facilities in industry sectors such 
as manufacturing, metal mining, electric utilities, and commercial hazardous waste 
management. Under the Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act 
(EPCRA), facilities must report their toxic chemical releases for the prior calendar 
year to EPA by 1st of July of each year. Moreover, the Pollution Prevention Act also 
requires facilities to submit information on pollution prevention and other waste 
management activities of TRI chemicals (EPA, 2017). Each basic data file contains 
108 data fields, which generally represent these categories:  
a) Facility name, address, latitude and longitude coordinates, SIC or NAICS codes 
and Industry Sector Codes  
b) Chemical identification and classification information  
c) On-site release quantities 
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d) Publicly Owned Treatment Works (POTW) Transfer Quantities  
e) Off-site Transfer Quantities for Release/Disposal and Further Waste Management  
f) Summary Pollution Prevention Quantities  
The relevant database is rapidly growing since in 1987, it included nearly 275 
toxic chemicals, while by 2015 this number had nearly doubled, to 600 chemicals, 
with some of the original chemicals dropped from the reporting requirements. 
However, for purposes of consistency, we restrict our sample to the 234 chemicals 
that appeared in the 1987 dataset and have been reported in every year since (Simon 
and Prince, 2016). Lastly, it is worth mentioning that the set of chemicals included in 
the TRI has evolved over time since primarily new chemicals have been added. 
However for consistency purposes we have excluded them from the sample selection.2  
The structural variables such as market concentration, level of employment, 
value added that correspond to each 6-digit code were drawn from the National 
Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) and especially from Manufacturing Industry 
Database (CES). This database contains annual industry-level data from 1958-2011 on 
output, employment, payroll and other input costs, investment, capital stocks, and 
various industry-specific price indexes. Because of the change from SIC to NAICS 
industry definitions in 1997, the database is provided in two versions (one with 459 
four-digit 1987 SIC industries and the other with 473 six-digit 1997 NAICS 
industries). Especially for the year 2012, and due to data restrictions concerning the 
level of market concentration as measured by certain indicators (i.e CR4, CR8, CR20, 
CR50 and HHI), we used data directly from the US Census of Manufacturers. The 
                                                   
2 Facilities are required to report their toxic releases to the EPA if they meet the following three 
criteria: (1) They have ten or more full-time employees (or the equivalent); (2) They are in a covered 
industry (all manufacturing industries, mining, electricity generation, hazardous waste facilities, along 
with some publishing and wholesale trade industries); and (3) They “manufactured" or "processed" 
more than 25,000 pounds or "otherwise used" more than 10,000 pounds of any listed toxic chemical 
during a calendar year. Plants that meet the first two criteria must report releases for each toxic 
chemical that exceeds the threshold in (3). 
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latter is only conducted every five years limiting our time span to six years (1987, 
1992, 1997, 2002, 2007 and 2012). We must mention though that while there are 
obvious benefits of having a strongly-balanced panel, there are costs as well. Due to 
the fact that TRI database constitutes an unbalanced panel, observations were dropped 
to balance the panel thus restricting a 25 year panel to 6 years.  
In order to check the robustness of our findings, we take five measures of 
market concentration: HHI is the Herfindahl-Hirschman index for the 50 largest firms 
in the industry3, CR4 is the four-firm concentration ratio, CR8 is the eight-firm 
concentration ratio, CR20, is the twenty-firm concentration ratio and finally CR50, is 
the fifty-firm concentration ratio. It is worth mentioning that our measures of market 
structure reveal the existence or the absence of effective competition in the industry 
since concentration is simply the inverse of competition (Cabral, 2017).   
Our sample consists of thousands observations, namely, 2,461 panels 
(facilities) times 6 years, and the panel data set is strongly balanced. We excluded 
observations for facilities with missing values for toxic chemical releases. Hence our 
sample includes 14,767 plants, spread across 356 six-digit NAICS industry codes. 
Especially, for the years 1987 and 1992 we used the SIC classification. Similarly to 
Simon and Prince (2016) we used the TRI database in order to incorporate the level of 
toxic chemical releases in our sample. However, there is significant difference in the 
magnitude of the two samples. Our sample consists of nearly 11,900 facility year 
observations, while the aforementioned study includes more than 80,000 observations. 
This discrepancy is the result of merging the two databases (i.e TRI with the NBER 
dataset). Lastly, similarly to Simon and Prince (2016), we were able to merge 
                                                   
3 The calculation of the HHI squares each market share (MS) and places a higher importance on those 
firms that have a larger market share.  The formula is as follows: HHI = MS1
2 + MS2
2 + MS3
2 + …+ 
MSn2. The HHI ranges from zero (Perfect competition) to unity (Monopoly).  
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chemical releases data with national industry concentration ratios drawn from the 
NBER database and the Census of Manufacturers (only for the year 2012) since each 
facility must indicate the primary operated industry.  
The starting date for the study was dictated by data availability, while the final 
date (2012), represents the last year for which data regarding the Census of 
Manufacturers were available at the time the research was conducted. Table 1 depicts 
the descriptive statistics for our sample variables. For the sample of facilities, the level 
of toxic releases averages 461,833 pounds (or 10.12 pounds in logged values). 
Similarly, the level of market concentration (measured by the four concentration 
ratios) ranges from 38 to 80. This masks a wide disparity across facilities and across 
time. It is also worth mentioning that the starting year of our sample (1987) where the 
TRI was reported, the median facility released 50,498 pounds of toxic chemicals. By 
2012, median facility releases had fallen to below 16,858 pounds, a roughly 67% 
reduction. 
<Insert Table 1 about here> 
 
3.1 Preliminary Testing for Cross-Section Dependence and Unit Roots  
One of the additional complications that arise when dealing with panel data 
compared to the pure time-series case, is the possibility that the variables or the 
random disturbances are correlated across the panel dimension. The early literature on 
unit root and cointegration tests adopted the assumption of no cross-sectional 
dependence (Pesaran, 2015). However, it is common for macro-level data to violate 
this assumption which will result in low power and size distortions of tests that 
assume cross-section independence. For example, cross-section dependence in our 
data may arise due to common unobserved effects due to changes in federal 
legislation.  Therefore, before proceeding to unit root and cointegration tests we test 
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for cross-section dependence (Halkos and Polemis, 2017). We use the cross-section 
dependence tests proposed by Breusch and Pagan (1980) and Pesaran (2004).4  
The tests are based on the estimation of the linear panel model of the form: 
       (1) 
where  and  are the time and panel dimensions respectively,  the 
provincial-specific intercept, and  a  vector of regressors, and  the random 
disturbance term. The null hypothesis in both tests assumes the existence of cross-
section correlation:  for all  and for all . This is tested against 
the alternative hypothesis that  for at least one pair of  and . The 
Breusch and Pagan (1980) and Pesaran (2004) tests are a type of Lagrange-Multiplier 
test that is based on the errors obtained from estimating Equation 1 by the OLS 
method. Both tests strongly reject the null hypothesis of cross-section independence 
(P-value = 0.000) for all the models, providing evidence of cross-sectional 
dependence in the data given the statistical significance of the CD statistic (see Table 
2).  In light of this evidence we proceed to test for unit roots using tests that are robust 
to cross-section dependence. 
<Insert Table 2 about here> 
 
To examine the stationarity properties of the variables in our models we use 
the “second generation” unit root tests for panel-data proposed by Breitung and Das 
(2005) and Pesaran (2007) that allow for cross-section dependence. Both tests are 
based on OLS regressions; however the Breitung and Das approach breaks down if it 
is assumed that cross-correlation is due to common factors while the Pesaran (2007) 
test, denoted as CIPS, remains valid (Halkos and Polemis, 2017). The test results 
                                                   
4 Since the cross-section dependence tests demonstrate that the error terms are correlated across 
facilities, it is worth mentioning that this issue could be alternatively addressed with the estimation of 
clustered standard errors, on the condition that the regimes have already been determined.  
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suggest that all the sample variables are stationary I(0).5 Hence we proceed with 
testing for the presence of thresholds.   
<Insert Table 3 about here> 
 
4.  Econometric framework  
We proceed with the estimation of the threshold regression model, where the 
concentration ratio (CR4) is used as the sorting (threshold) variable that classifies the 
facilities in a competitive and a non-competitive industry regime. Hansen (1999; 
2000) provides an estimation method based on a Concentrated Least Squares (CLS) 
procedure and he obtains the properties of the threshold and slope parameter 
estimators. In other words, the approach that we employ here does not rely on a 
known threshold parameter, but one that needs to be estimated along-side the other 
unknown parameters of the model. However, the method is based on first testing for 
the presence of a threshold effect. Once we reject the null of no threshold(s) we 
proceed in the estimation of the model that includes the estimation of the threshold(s) 
and allows for the sample split. The technique is based on a CLS method that splits 
the model into the two regimes, whereby there is a full interaction of all the variables 
with the (estimated) threshold.   
We proceed to test for the presence of a (significant) threshold that allows for 
the comparison between the TR model and the simple linear benchmark without a 
threshold. It is worth noting that the threshold parameter is not identified under the 
null hypothesis of no threshold and usual test statistics have non-standard 
distributions. For that reason, Hansen (1999, 2000) suggests a bootstrap methodology 
                                                   
5 In accordance with the LM-statistic of Breusch and Pagan (1980), we can reject cross-sectional 
independence among the sample variables (with p-values virtually equal to zero). 
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based on the utilization of a heteroskedasticity consistent Lagrange Multiplier (LM) 
bootstrap procedure to test H0 of a linear formulation against a threshold formulation.  
We argue though that an alternative, but less sophisticated approach to 
investigating non-linear effects would be to simply use higher order polynomial 
regressors of market concentration (squared, cubed terms, etc) instead of a panel 
threshold model.  One could also resort alternatively to a semiparametric specification 
using local smoothers or splines/series to capture possible turning points. However 
such methods involve bandwidth choices and they do not lend themselves to 
estimating sharp turning points/thresholds as it is the case in the threshold model that 
we adopt in a fully interactive way (Kourtelos et al, 2016). Moreover, one important 
advantage of this methodology is that it avoids the ad hoc, subjective pre-selection of 
threshold values which has been a major critique of previous studies (Christie, 2014). 
In contrast to a simple case where the sample is split according to a known pre-
assigned threshold value, the method that we use first tests for the presence of such a 
threshold and then estimates it (see for example Hansen, 2000; Caner and Hansen, 
2004 and Kourtellos et al, 2016).  In principle, one can test for additional sample 
splits, something that we did and we were able to detect. Based on the above, our 
threshold model takes the following form: 
( )ijt it it i t itY X b X I z d n v                                               (2) 
where subscripts j = 1,...ν, denote the facility (plant) that generates the 
chemical releases, i = 1, ..., N represent the six-digit code industry and t = 1, … , T 
indexes the time. ni is the firm-specific fixed effect that control for differences across 
facilities such as technological innovations and chemicals used in the production 
process, capturing individual heterogeneity. We also include the relevant year (time) 
fixed effect (vt) which captures the co movement of the series due to external shocks 
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(Asimakopoulos and Karavias, 2016). Yijt denotes the dependent variable (LREL). z is 
the vector of threshold variables namely CR4it and HHIit.6 In addition, Xit is the vector 
of exogenous control variables (LSHIP, LVADD, LEMP, LINVEST, LCAP) where 
slope coefficients are assumed to be regime independent. I (·) is the indicator function 
taking the value 1 when the condition in the parenthesis is satisfied and 0 otherwise 
which represents the regime defined by each threshold variable (CR4 and HHI 
respectively), and the threshold value γ that needs to be estimated within the model. 
Finally εit denotes the idiosyncratic i.i.d error term. 
We complement the threshold model with a benchmark linear analysis in order 
to draw sharp differences between these results and the traditional benchmark linear 
specifications. We provide below the general exposition of the two linear models 
accounting for the presence of CR4 (Model I) and HHI (Model II) respectively7   
0 1 2 3 4 5 6ln ln ln 4 ln ln ln lnitit it itijt it it i t itREL a a SHIP a CR a VADD a EMP a INVEST a CAP n u              
(3) 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6ln ln ln ln ln ln lnit itit itijt it it i t itREL a a SHIP a HHI a VADD a EMP a INVEST a CAP n u             
(4) 
The interpretation of the variables comes as follows. lnRELijt, denotes the 
logged total (on-site and off-site) chemical releases emitted by facility j in industry i 
across the year t. lnSHIPit is the logged value of shipments as a proxy for market size 
for industry i during year t. CR4it, is one of our four concentration ratios of market 
structure allowing for certain cyclical behaviour (nonlinearities) in the impact of the 
covariates on the dependent variable.8 lnVADDit, is the total value added for industry 
i during year t as a proxy for industry output expressed in natural logarithm. lnEMPit, 
is the logged value of total employment for industry i during year t as a proxy for 
                                                   
6 We have also estimated our threshold model with the inclusion of the other three market 
concentration measures (i.e CR8, CR20 and CR50) as a robustness check and the results do not change 
significantly. The results are available upon request. 
7 The results do not drastically change if we estimate a semi logged model similar to Simon and Prince 
(2016).  
8 For the use of concentration ratios see also Polemis and Stengos (2015).  
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labour. lnINVESTit, denotes the total capital expenditure for industry i during year t as 
a proxy for capital, and subsequently lnCAPit, is the total real capital stock for 
industry i during year t as a proxy for intermediate inputs. Moreover, ni is the unit-
specific residual that differs between sectors but remains constant for any particular 
sector (unobserved sector level effect); while ut captures the time effect and therefore 
differs across years but is constant for all sectors in a particular year. Finally εit 
denotes the error term. 
 
 
5.  Results and discussion  
In this section, we present the results of the threshold fixed effects model 
along with the benchmark linear specification for each of the two alternative measures 
of market concentration (threshold variables). In addition, we offer a comparative 
discussion between the threshold effects and the static panel fixed effects linear 
specification benchmark models.  
5.1  Testing for thresholds and estimating the linear model   
We carry out the first part of the empirical analysis by determining the number 
of thresholds. For this reason, Equation (2) is estimated by OLS, allowing for 
(sequentially) zero, one and two thresholds respectively. The test statistics LM1 and 
LM2, along with their bootstrap p-values, are shown in Table 4. Specifically, we find 
that the test for a single threshold LM1 is highly significant in both models with a 
bootstrap p-value of 0.00. On the other hand, the test for a second threshold LM2 is 
also highly statistically significant, with a bootstrap p-value for each of the two 
models (Model I and II) equal to 0.00 and 0.00 respectively. As a consequence, we 
infer that there are two thresholds in all of the regression relationships.  
<Insert Table 4 about here> 
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The point estimates of the thresholds for the two models are also reported in 
the relevant table. The estimates range from 3.70 to 4.20 (Model I) and 6.00 to 6.50 
(Model II). The estimated values for the second threshold split the sample into two 
regimes. The first regime captures the medium and high levels of concentration since 
it includes the facilities where the sum of the four largest companies are below the 
value of 67 (or 4.20 in logged levels), while in the second regime the firms are 
characterised by significantly high levels of market concentration since only four 
firms possess more than 67% of the market. Similar interpretation applies to the HHI.9 
As a consequence, the two classes of facilities indicated by the point estimates are 
those with medium-high and very high level of market concentration respectively. In 
other words, the existence of a second threshold classifies the industrial facilities into 
competitive and non-competitive conditions respectively.    
After having estimated the appropriate number of thresholds, we proceed with 
the exposition of results generated from the benchmark linear specification that will 
be contrasted with the threshold model. From the following table, it is evident that 
nearly all of the variables are statistically significant in either of the two specifications 
(with or without the time effects). However, the relevant signs of most of the 
regressors entering the two models (Model I and Model II) differ drastically.  
Specifically, there is evidence supporting the argument that the market 
concentration proxied by the lnCR4 is positively correlated with a higher level of 
pollution, in both models. Regarding Model II, our estimates are higher than the ones 
reported by Simon and Prince (2016), ranging from 0.323 to 0.346 compared with the 
estimated value of 0.107. We argue that each percentage-point reduction in the lnHHI 
results in more than three percent reduction in a facility’s toxic releases. The range of 
                                                   
9 The first (second) regime includes the facilities where the sum of the squared market shares of the 
fifty largest companies is below (above) the value of 665 (or 6.50 in logarithmic scale). 
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this discrepancy could be attributed to the different samples as well as the model 
specifications followed in two studies. 
Similarly, market size (lnSHIP) increases the level of industrial pollution when 
lnCR4 and lnHHI are taken into account respectively. In addition, the estimates for 
the level of industry output (lnVADD) reveal a negative correlation with the level of 
toxic chemical releases (see Model I and II respectively). The adverse result is evident 
when intermediate inputs (lnCAP) are taken into account. More specifically, it seems 
that real capital stock is positively correlated with the level of industrial pollution 
emitted by the facilities. On the other hand, there is strong evidence that labour 
intensive facilities do not stimulate toxic chemical releases since the relevant 
estimates (lnEMP) although positive in most specifications are not statistically 
significant. The opposite result is evident when the level of capital expenditures 
(lnINVEST) interacts with industrial pollution. From the magnitude of the relevant 
elasticities, we argue that a 10 percentage point increase (decrease) in the level of 
capital expenditures will lead to a 7.5 percentage point increase (decrease) in the level 
of toxic chemical releases.              
< Insert Table 5 about here > 
 
However, as it will be shown below, the results of the benchmark static model 
compared with the threshold effects model that we use in the present study reveal 
significant differences in the interpretation of the key variable of interest (market 
concentration). This means that the benchmark model does not capture the nonlinear 
effects stemmed from the existence of a double threshold according to the 
bootstrapped P-values of the relevant LM tests (see Table 4). Therefore, the threshold 
model is better suited to assess these effects on chemical releases under two different 
regimes (competitive and non-competitive conditions).  
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5.2  The threshold model   
The results for the empirical relation between the (logged) toxic chemical 
releases and its main drivers under the tow regimes (competitive and non-competitive 
conditions) are depicted in Table 6. When the level of the four largest industries in the 
sector (CR4) is taken into account as the threshold variable (Model I) it is evident that 
nearly all of the control variables are statistically significant and plausibly signed. 
(Model I)  
< Insert Table 6 about here > 
 
The main variable of interest is the level of market concentration measured by 
the four largest firms in terms of their market shares. Recall, that when entered 
linearly, the coefficient is positive and statistically significant at the 1% level 
indicating that a one-percentage point decrease in market concentration reduces the 
level of industrial pollution by nearly 0.7 of a percentage point (see Table 5). On the 
other hand, the results for the non-linear model with a (double) threshold on market 
concentration at 67 percent, do suggest a strong non-linear relationship between 
competition and pollution. The point estimates suggest that the level of concentration 
(competition) is positively (negatively) related to the level of toxic chemical releases 
when time dummies are taken into account (see columns 1 and 2). However, it is 
evident that the CR4 index is more important in the sample below the threshold 
(competitive regime) since the relevant coefficient (2.336) is highly statistically 
significant. This means that a 10% decrease in the level of market concentration leads 
to a 23% decrease in the total chemical releases. This finding concurs that for already 
competitive sectors the level of market concentration does affect industrial output and 
subsequently the level of toxic releases emitted in the atmosphere. These results are in 
alignment with existing studies (Farber and Martin, 1986; Simon and Prince, 2016) 
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where it is supported that competition effect would tend to lower pollution per 
facility.       
Notably, the other control variables have the expected signs and are all 
statistically significant in both models (with and without time effects). More 
specifically, the level of industrial output proxied by the logged value added 
(lnVADD) has a negative impact on industrial pollution, indicating the presence of a 
strong technological effect since industrial facilities operating to high value added 
sectors are more prone to undertake actions limiting chemical releases (i.e energy 
conservation, waste management, etc). The magnitude of the estimates range from -
2.037 (column 6) to -2.715 (column 1) indicating that a one percentage percent 
increase (decrease) in the level of industrial output (value added) results in 
approximately 2.5 percent decrease (increase) of the toxic chemical releases.  
It is noteworthy that the aforementioned estimates do not vary substantially in 
their magnitude under the two different regimes. On the contrary the market size as 
expressed by the (logged) value of shipments (lnSHIP) varies considerably when the 
threshold value is taken into account. Specifically, for observations falling in the high 
(non-competitive) regime, further increases in the level of market size increase toxic 
chemical releases by 2.5 percentage points. This is contrasted against increases in the 
level of value added below the threshold value which displays a less direct effect on 
pollution. While the coefficients in both models (with and without time dummies) 
remain positive, are small in their magnitude and statistically significant not 
exceeding the value of 0.85. The relevant magnitude of the estimates although smaller 
than their counterparts in the model above the threshold (see columns 2 and 6) they 
are significantly higher than the ones reported by the existing literature (see Simon 
and Prince, 2016). The discrepancy could be justified by the fact that we uncovered a 
non-linear relationship between competition and industrial pollution.    
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  Also as expected, increases in employment (lnEMP) reduce toxic pollution, 
but the estimated coefficients are small and only significant at the model above the 
threshold (-0.411 and -0.425 respectively). The magnitude of the relevant estimates 
denotes that for the non-competitive regime a 10 percent increase (decrease) of the 
level of employment in the industry would tend to lower (increase) pollution per 
facility by nearly 4 percent. This could be attributed to the fact that an increase in the 
level of employment would lower the capital to labour ratio (K/L) and hence the level 
of industrial emissions.  
The coefficient on the level of total capital expenditure (lnINVEST) is positive 
and highly statistically significant in all of the specifications. For the model below the 
threshold (see columns 1 and 5), it is evident that a one-percentage point increase in 
capital investment can stimulate toxic releases by nearly 0.44 of a percentage point on 
average in each of the two specifications (with and without time effects). The rate of 
change is larger in its magnitude when we account for the model above the threshold 
(non-competitive) in which elasticities are equal to 0.527 and 0.492 respectively (see 
columns 2 and 6). These findings compared with the previous ones indicate that 
industrial pollution is evident (hidden) in capital (labour) intensive sectors. Lastly, the 
positive effect of intermediate inputs proxied by the total real capital stock (lnCAP) 
on pollution is evident in all of the specifications (see columns 1,2,5 and 6).   
The discussion now turns to the alterative measure of market concentration 
namely the logged value of the Hirschman-Herfindahl index (lnHHI). Although 
difficult in its computation, the HHI provides a better measure of market 
concentration since it takes into account all the market shares of the firms in an 
industry (here the first fifty firms) compared to the concentration ratio of the four 
largest firms (Cabral, 2017). 
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Table 6 depicts the results for the empirical relation between market 
concentration (lnHHI) and the other covariates with the level of toxic releases under a 
competitive and non-competitive regime. According to the relevant table, nearly all of 
the main covariates are statistically significant and plausibly signed (Model II). Our 
key variable of interest is the level of market concentration (lnHHI). In this case, the 
impact of concentration on industrial pollution alternates its sign depending on the 
different competitive regime.  
More specifically, the relationship between competition and toxic releases is 
negative (positive) when the threshold is high (low). This means that for observations 
falling into low regime (competitive) market concentration induces firms to increase 
output and hence the total level of pollution highlighting a positive net effect of 
competition, while the opposite holds for the high regime (non-competitive). This 
finding traces out the existence of an inverted “V-shaped” relationship between 
market concentration and industrial pollution at facility level.10 More specifically, we 
are the first to uncover a non-linear statistically significant relationship between 
competition and industrial toxic releases for both above and below the threshold (665 
units or 6.5 in logarithmic scale).  
In particular, when the market concentration of the average facility is below 
the threshold, a one percent increase in the level of competition will reduce toxic 
emissions by 0.81 and 1.15 percent respectively (see columns 3 and 7). In this case we 
are on the upward slopping part of the curve. However, if the average facility is above 
the threshold then a one percent decrease in the level of competition will result in an 
increase of toxic releases by 0.52 and 0.65 percent respectively in both specifications 
(with and without time effects). This means that we are on the downward sloping part 
                                                   
10 Since competition is the inverse of market concentration, we can also argue that there is a “V’ shape 
relationship between competition and industrial pollution at plant level (facility). 
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of the concentration-pollution curve. As a consequence, the impact of competition on 
industrial pollution is larger quantitatively when it is below the estimated threshold. 
Lastly, regarding the remaining variables we find that the estimated value of 
shipments is positive and statistically significant in both regimes ranging from 0.550 
to 0.954. Similarly to Model I, the magnitude of this variable is larger when the 
observations fall above than below the threshold (0.929 compared to 0.595 when time 
dummies exist). The level of value added and the employment are negatively 
correlated with the level of industrial pollution, while capital expenditures reveal a 
strong positive effect on toxic releases. Finally, the coefficient of capital stock is 
around to unity on average when the observations are classified above and below the 
threshold.  
6.  Robustness checks    
In order to check for the robustness of our findings, we re-estimate our basic 
linear model which is accordingly adjusted for the presence of three distinct 
concentration variables namely CR8, CR20 and CR50 respectively. These structural 
indicators capture the impact of the eight, twenty and fifty largest firms (measured on a 
1-100 scale) in the industry respectively.  
The empirical results when different aspects of market power are taken into 
account do not reveal significant differences regarding the competition variables and 
the set of the other covariates including the interaction terms. It is worth mentioning 
that, these interaction terms completely change the meaning of the coefficient on 
concentration. In other words the latter indicates the marginal effect of concentration 
when all the other RHS variables (that are interacted with concentration) are equal to 
zero (i.e when the logged values of these variables are equal to one). Despite the 
presence of so many interaction terms the empirical findings do not reveal significant 
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discrepancies between the linear specifications and the TR model as already examined 
implying that the results are rather robust.   
Nearly in all of the specifications, the control variables are statistically 
significant with the appropriate signs (see Table I in the Appendix).  More 
specifically, when entered linearly, the estimate of the market concentration in all of 
the specifications (with and without time effects) is positive and statistically 
significant at the 1% level. It is noteworthy that the relevant magnitude ranges from 
0.996 to 3.137 In other words a ten-percentage point increase in market concentration 
increases toxic chemical releases by 9.6% and 31.3% respectively. As a consequence, 
the negative relationship between the level of competition and the pollution emitted 
from industrial facilities seems to be in alignment with the possibly positive effect on 
abatement (Simon and Prince, 2016). In contrast to other studies, the possibility of a 
non-linear effect is well captured by the inclusion of the cross terms. More 
specifically, nearly all of the interaction terms in the three models are statistically 
significant denoting the existence of a possible non-linear relationship between the 
level of market power (and hence competition) and environmental damage.    
Lastly, the inclusion of market concentration as an indicator of SMP might 
raise a possible endogeneity issue. Knowledge of the actual causality direction 
between market concentration and industrial pollution has important implications for 
modeling suitable environmental policies. Specifically, if the causality runs from 
market concentration to pollution, then environmental policies for combating toxic 
emissions may not affect the level of competition in the industry. On the other hand, if 
the causality is reversed, then environmental policies aimed at restricting industrial 
output and thus emissions may negatively affect the level of market structure by 
distorting effective competition.  To tackle the presence of a possible endogeneity in 
the concentration variables, we have also used the lagged CR4 and HHI as regressors 
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and our results remained fairly robust to whether we used current or lagged values of 
market concentration. All in all, we feel that the issue of endogeneity is not as severe 
in our case.11 
7.  Conclusions and policy implications  
Toxic chemical prevention is emphasized in the U.S. environmental agenda as 
one of the primary means of industrial pollution abatement. The latter however, has 
been thoroughly investigated at an industry level neglecting the role of market 
structure and effective competition. In this study, we use a unique data set at the plant 
level comprising by thousands of industrial facilities dispersed among the US states 
over the period 1987-2012, in order to investigate the effects of industrial pollution 
prevention activities on toxic chemical releases under the presence of two market 
regimes (competitive and non competitive conditions).    
For this reason, we utilised for the first time a static panel threshold model 
which allows for the presence of non-linear effects. The methodology applied 
supports new empirical findings that are of interest to policy makers and government 
officials regarding the non-linear nature of pollution. Moreover, our empirics cast 
doubt on the existence of a unilateral positive or negative effect of competition on 
pollution since we claim that a rather mixed (non-linear) effect prevails.  
We uncover that the non-linear relationship is statistically significant above 
and below the estimated (double) threshold value, even after allowing for alternative 
specifications of market concentration. Our empirical findings do indicate that on 
average, each percentage-point reduction (increase) in the HHI results in a nearly one 
percent reduction (increase) in a facility’s toxic releases when we are below the 
threshold level. On the other side of the curve, a ten percent reduction (increase) in the 
                                                   
11 To preserve space, the results are available from the authors upon request.  
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concentration index induces an approximately six percent increase (reduction) in the 
level of pollution. 
Taken together, these sets of findings fully justify the existence of an inverted 
"V-shaped" curve linking concentration and industrial pollution. This relationship 
provides new insights into the environmental policy design toward releases abatement 
since the policy makers must take into account if they are on the upward or the 
downward slopping part of the curve. It is worth emphasizing that the increasing 
nonparametric regression line up to a certain concentration level (threshold) of 665 
units approximately indicates a negative effect on facilities’ emissions levels whereas 
a decreasing line indicates a positive effect. Moreover, our models concur that the 
results remained robust under different specifications not driven by endogeneity.   
The empirical findings indicate that when concentration level increases up to 
that point industries’ toxic releases levels are also increasing. However after that 
estimated peak (“turning point’’) it is evident that the regression line slightly 
decreases henceforth, revealing a negative effect of competition on environmental 
degradation. In other words, within this interval, the logged level of concentration has 
a positive impact on environmental pollution (decreasing part of the curve) creating 
an inverted "V-shaped" curve. Lieb (2003) asserts that the upturn of an inverted "U-
shaped" Environmental Kuznets Curve (EKC) may be justified by the achievement of 
the internalization of the pollution externality on top of that the control chances are 
exhausted. On the contrary, the declining part of the curve may be because of a shock.  
 These set of empirical findings could be important for policy makers, academic 
researchers and practitioners. More specifically, they call for the need to strengthen 
the effectiveness of ecological-friendly policies by taking into consideration the 
market structure and the subsequent level of competition in an industry in order to 
drastically abate chemical pollution. Specifically, policy makers and government 
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officials have to stimulate investments in value added sectors (i.e energy sector) and 
more likely to promote the use of renewable energy sources. This can be accompanied 
by more financial resources for research and development and more cost effective 
mitigation methods. 
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List of Tables 
 
Table 1: Descriptive statistics  
      
Variable Observations Mean Standard Deviation  Min  Max  
      
lnREL 14,772 10.12 2.77 0.69 18.78 
lnSHIP 14,292 16.18 1.49 4.38 20.18 
CR4 14,299 38.10 20.27 2.00 100.00 
CR8 14,297 51.57 22.59 2.00 100.00 
CR20 14,266 67.51 22.30 5.00 100.00 
CR50 14,230 80.07 20.86 8.00 100.00 
HHI 11,878 617.8 591.00 15.00 2.99 
lnCR4 14,271 3.47 0.62 0.69 4.60 
lnCR8 14,297 3.82 0.55 0.69 4.60 
lnCR20 14,225 4.14 0.44 1.60 4.60 
lnCR50 14,117 4.34 0.34 2.08 4.60 
lnHHI 11,729 5.97 1.09 2.71 8.00 
lnEMP 11,906 3.67 0.91 0.10 6.25 
lnVADD 11,906 8.58 1.11 4.69 11.61 
lnINVEST 11,906 5.98 1.36 0.99 9.72 
lnCAP 11,906 8.65 1.28 3.92 11.51 
      
Note: All variables except for the concentration measures (i.e CR4, CR8, CR20, CR50 and HHI) are expressed in natural 
logarithms. lnREL denotes the logged total (on-site and off-site) chemical releases. lnSHIP is the logged value of shipments. 
lnCR4 is the logged concentration ratio of the four largest companies in the sector. lnCR8 is the logged concentration ratio of the 
eight largest companies in the sector. lnCR20 is the logged concentration ratio of the twenty largest companies in the sector  
lnCR50 is the logged concentration ratio of the fifty largest companies in the sector. lnHHI is the logged Hirschman-Herfindahl 
index of the fifty largest companies in the sector. lnVADD, is the natural logarithm of the total value added. LEMP  denotes the 
logged value of total employment. lnINVEST stands for the total capital expenditure and lnCAP is the total real capital stock. 
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Table 2: Cross-section dependence test  
Variable      CD test   P-value          Correlation  Absolute  
(correlation) 
lnREL 133.05*** 0.000 0.692 0.692 
lnSHIP 143.34 *** 0.000 0.768 0.768 
CR4 155.27*** 0.000 0.831 0.831 
CR8 157.21*** 0.000 0.842 0.842 
CR20 155.89 *** 0.000 0.836 0.836 
CR50 159.52 *** 0.000 0.858 0.858 
HHI 85.33*** 0.000 0.468 0.535 
lnCR4 157.56*** 0.000 0.845 0.845 
lnCR8 161.55*** 0.000 0.866 0.866 
lnCR20 163.82*** 0.000 0.882 0.882 
lnCR50 164.14*** 0.000 0.886 0.886 
lnHHI 103.39*** 0.000 0.596 0.608 
lnEMP 122.95*** 0.000 0.806 0.806 
lnVADD 127.28*** 0.000 0.835 0.835 
lnINVEST 127.54*** 0.000 0.837 0.837 
lnCAP 134.45 *** 0.000 0.883 0.883 
Note: Under the null hypothesis of cross-sectional independence the CD statistic is distributed as a two-tailed standard normal. 
Results are based on the test of Pesaran (2004). The p-values are for a one-sided test based on the normal distribution. 
Correlation and Absolute (correlation) are the average (absolute) value of the off-diagonal elements of the cross-sectional 
correlation matrix of residuals. lnREL denotes the logged total (on-site and off-site) chemical releases. lnSHIP is the logged 
value of shipments. lnCR4 is the logged concentration ratio of the four largest companies in the sector. lnCR8 is the logged 
concentration ratio of the eight largest companies in the sector. lnCR20 is the logged concentration ratio of the twenty largest 
companies in the sector  lnCR50 is the logged concentration ratio of the fifty largest companies in the sector. lnHHI is the logged 
Hirschman-Herfindahl index of the fifty largest companies in the sector. lnVADD, is the natural logarithm of the total value 
added. LEMP denotes the logged value of total employment. lnINVEST stands for the total capital expenditure and lnCAP is the 
total real capital stock. Significant at ***1%.  
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Table 3: Panel unit root tests 
 Statistic  
Variable Breitung and Das  (2005)  Pesaran (2006)  
lnREL -23.0000*** -51.4745*** 
lnSHIP -23.5125 *** -46.2411*** 
lnCR4 -37.8671 *** -54.1824 *** 
lnCR8   -39.4864***   -54.5119 *** 
lnCR20   -41.8846 *** -55.9387  *** 
lnCR50 -39.3244***   -57.3004*** 
lnHHI -39.6548*** -53.0001*** 
lnEMP -34.5414*** -54.7660*** 
lnVADD -24.3578***   -48.9113*** 
lnINVEST     -21.8293*** -47.5499*** 
lnCAP   -23.6705*** -47.2386*** 
 Note: The number of lags has been set to two according to BIC. The Augmented Dickey Fuller test is used rather than Phillips-
Perron test. The null hypothesis assumes that the variable contains unit root. lnREL denotes the logged total (on-site and off-site) 
chemical releases. lnSHIP is the logged value of shipments. lnCR4 is the logged concentration ratio of the four largest compa nies 
in the sector. lnCR8 is the logged concentration ratio of the eight largest companies in the sector. lnCR20 is the logged 
concentration ratio of the twenty largest companies in the sector  lnCR50 is the logged concentration ratio of the fifty largest 
companies in the sector. lnHHI is the logged Hirschman-Herfindahl index of the fifty largest companies in the sector. lnVADD, 
is the natural logarithm of the total value added. LEMP denotes the logged value of total employment. lnINVEST stands for the 
total capital expenditure and lnCAP is the total real capital stock. Significant at ***1%.      
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4: Test for the existence of threshold(s)  
Test for single threshold  Model with lnCR4 Model with lnHHI 
Threshold estimate γ  3.700 6.00 
LM1 488.46*** 402.76*** 
Bootstrap P-value 0.00 0.00 
Test for double threshold  Model with lnCR4 Model with lnHHI 
Threshold estimate γ 4.20 6.50 
LM2 137.28*** 111.74*** 
Bootstrap P-value 0.00 0.00 
Note: Test of Null of No Threshold Against Alternative of Threshold Allowing Heteroskedastic Errors (White Corrected). The 
trimming percentage is set to 0.15 and the Bootstrap replications are set to 1000. Significant at ***1%  
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Table 5: Linear Estimation Results  
 With time effects  Without time effects  
Variable  Model I Model II Model I Model II 
lnSHIP 0.433*** 
(0.0756) 
0.401*** 
(0.0765) 
0.445*** 
(0.0754) 
0.412*** 
(0.0764) 
lnCR4 0.682*** 
(0.0923) 
- 0.692*** 
(0.0446) 
- 
lnHHI - 0.323*** 
(0.0533) 
- 0.346*** 
(0.0258) 
lnVADD -1.451*** 
(0.0992) 
-1.430*** 
(0.101) 
-1.440*** 
(0.0991) 
-1.411*** 
(0.101) 
lnEMP 0.0922* 
(0.0552) 
0.0710 
(0.0563) 
0.0772 
(0.0547) 
0.0430 
(0.0557) 
lnINVEST 0.491*** 
(0.0705) 
0.519*** 
(0.0720) 
0.485*** 
(0.0704) 
0.506*** 
(0.0719) 
lnCAP 0.750*** 
(0.0639) 
0.745*** 
(0.0650) 
 
0.745*** 
(0.0639) 
0.747*** 
(0.0648) 
Constant 3.462*** 
(0.688) 
4.014*** 
(0.699) 
3.337*** 
(0.686) 
3.904*** 
(0.698) 
Diagnostics 
Observations  11,878 11,607 11,878 11,607 
Facilities 2,375.6 2,321.4 2,375.6 2,321.4 
Years 6 6 6 6 
R-squared (within) 0.1254 0.1326 0.1248 0.1233 
F-statistic  170.11***  
[0.000] 
164.15***  
[0.000] 
282.14***  
[0.000] 
272.33*** 
[0.000] 
HW 32.21*** 
[0.000] 
31.26*** 
[0.000] 
32.06*** 
[0.000] 
31.73*** 
[0.000] 
W-T 405.281*** 
[0.0000] 
205.875*** 
[0.0001] 
387.344*** 
[0.000] 
194.132*** 
[0.0002] 
Note: The market concentration variable is either the concentration ratio of the four largest companies (CR4) in the sector 
(Model I) or the Hirschman-Herfindahl index of the 50 largest companies (HHI) in the sector (Model II). lnREL denotes the 
logged total (on-site and off-site) chemical releases. lnSHIP is the logged value of shipments. lnCR4 is the logged concentration 
ratio of the four largest companies in the sector. lnHHI is the logged Hirschman-Herfindahl index of the fifty largest companies 
in the sector. lnVADD, is the natural logarithm of the total value added. LEMP denotes the logged value of total employment. 
lnINVEST stands for the total capital expenditure and lnCAP is the total real capital stock. W-T denotes the Wooldridge test for 
autocorrelation in panel data. The use of the fixed compared to random effects is justified after a Hausman test for each model. 
All models include state year fixed effects. Standard errors are in parentheses. To preserve space, we have deleted the results of 
the time dummies and their interactions with the threshold variables CR4 and HHI respectively. The numbers in square brackets 
are the p-values. Significant at ***1%, **5% and *10% respectively. HW is the Huber/White test for groupwise heteroscedasticity. 
W-T is the Wooldridge test for autocorrelation in panel data.   
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     Table 6: Regression Estimates for the Double Threshold Model 
 With time effects Without time effects 
 Model I Model II Model I Model II 
Variables 
(1) 
Threshold  
1 4.20a   
(2) 
Threshold 
2 4.20a   
(3) 
Threshold 
1 6.5a   
(4) 
Threshold 
2 6.5a   
(5) 
Threshold 
1 4.20a   
(6) 
Threshold 
2 4.20a   
(7) 
Threshold 
1 6.5a   
(8) 
Threshold 
2 6.5a   
lnSHIP 0.855*** 
(0.136) 
2.581*** 
(0.275) 
0.595*** 
(0.143) 
0.929*** 
(0.140) 
2.515*** 
(0.274) 
0.713*** 
(0.129) 
0.550*** 
(0.141) 
0.954*** 
(0.139) 
lnVADD -2.715*** 
(0.175) 
-2.045*** 
(0.275) 
-1.880*** 
(0.239) 
-2.260*** 
(0.164) 
-2.037*** 
(0.274) 
-2.541*** 
(0.169) 
-1.815*** 
(0.237) 
-2.324*** 
(0.163) 
lnEMP -0.0190 
(0.0872) 
-0.411*** 
(0.117) 
0.119 
(0.156) 
-0.317*** 
(0.0738) 
-0.425*** 
(0.117) 
-0.0713 
(0.0860) 
0.119 
(0.156) 
-0.289*** 
(0.0734) 
lnINVEST 0.415*** 
(0.128) 
0.527** 
(0.210) 
0.716*** 
(0.157) 
0.396*** 
(0.123) 
0.492** 
(0.205) 
0.462*** 
(0.126) 
0.641*** 
(0.153) 
0.432*** 
(0.122) 
lnCAP 1.564*** 
(0.122) 
0.732*** 
(0.212) 
0.777*** 
(0.160) 
1.367*** 
(0.116) 
-0.633*** 
(0.209) 
1.543*** 
(0.119) 
0.832*** 
(0.158) 
1.364*** 
(0.116) 
lnCR4  4.20 
2.336** 
(1.029) 
- - - 1.315*** 
(0.425) 
- - - 
4.20 < lnCR4 
- -2.556* 
(1.650) 
- - - -0.691*** 
(0.214) 
- - 
lnHHI  6.50 
- 
- 
0.813* 
(0.451) 
- 
- - 
1.150*** 
(0.421) 
- 
6.50 < lnHHI 
- - - -0.516* 
(0.291) 
- - - -0.652*** 
(0.119) 
Constant 7.457*** 
(2.023) 
-14.35*** 
(3.761) 
-2.312 
(3.016) 
6.249*** 
(1.521) 
-14.09*** 
(3.759) 
7.725*** 
(2.020) 
-1.768 
(3.007) 
6.358*** 
(1.515) 
Diagnostics 
Observations 2,626 1,220 2,063 3,035 2,626 1,220 2,063 3,035 
Facilities 525 244 413 607 525 244 413 607 
Years 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 
Fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes No No No No 
R-squared (within) 0.212 0.122 0.200 0.181 0.206 0.113 0.198 0.176 
F-statistic  70.21*** 
[0.000] 
16.78*** 
[0.000] 
73.09*** 
[0.000] 
66.71*** 
[0.000] 
112.93*** 
[0.0000] 
25.78*** 
[0.0000] 
84.41*** 
[0.0000] 
107.82*** 
[0.0000] 
HW 8.50 
[0.1309] 
8.98 
[0.1098] 
26.68*** 
[0.0001] 
4.40 
[0.4938] 
8.50 
[0.1306] 
8.86 
[0.1146] 
26.27*** 
[0.0001] 
4.46 
[0.4855] 
W-T 43.192*** 
[0.0028] 
15.464** 
[0.0171] 
41.762*** 
[0.0030] 
208.276*** 
[0.0001] 
44.196*** 
[  0.0027] 
16.707** 
[0.0150] 
41.874*** 
[0.0029] 
212.557*** 
[0.0000] 
Note: lnREL denotes the logged total (on-site and off-site) chemical releases. lnSHIP is the logged value of shipments. lnCR4 is the logged concentration ratio of the four largest companies in the sector. lnHHI is the logged Hirschman-Herfindahl index 
of the fifty largest companies in the sector. lnVADD, is the natural logarithm of the total value added. LEMP  denotes the logged value of total employment. lnINVEST stands for the total capital expenditure and lnCAP is the total real capital stock. All 
models include state year fixed effects.Significant at ***1%, **5% and *10% respectively. HW is the Huber/White test for groupwise heteroscedasticity. W-T is the Wooldridge test for autocorrelation in panel data.   
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Appendix 
 
Table I: Alternative Linear Estimation Results  
 With time effects Without time effects 
Variable  Model III Model IV Model V Model III Model IV Model V 
lnSHIP 3.242*** 
(1.042) 
4.670*** 
(1.116) 
0.828** 
(0.403) 
-0.130 
(0.746) 
0.600 
(0.793) 
0.537 
(0.492) 
lnCR8 0.996*** 
(0.166) 
- - 0.466*** 
(0.137) 
- - 
lnCR20 - 2.022*** 
(0.346) 
- - 1.330*** 
(0.332) 
- 
lnCR50 - - 3.137*** 
(0.359) 
- - 1.960*** 
(0.507) 
lnVADD 0.723 
(2.903) 
-2.928 
(3.080) 
1.245 
(1.112) 
9.491*** 
(2.127) 
7.958*** 
(2.180) 
4.284*** 
(1.374) 
lnEMP 16.90*** 
(1.212) 
17.71*** 
(1.269) 
6.499*** 
(0.514) 
12.98*** 
(0.901) 
12.79*** 
(0.908) 
8.734*** 
(0.632) 
lnINVEST -5.332*** 
(1.084) 
-4.775*** 
(1.122) 
-3.016*** 
(0.531) 
-6.905*** 
(0.948) 
-6.629*** 
(0.958) 
-4.293*** 
(0.696) 
lnCAP -12.17*** 
(1.156) 
-11.55*** 
(1.177) 
-3.240*** 
(0.549) 
-11.52*** 
(1.098) 
-10.91*** 
(1.120) 
-6.357*** 
(0.746) 
lnCR8  lnSHIP -0.661*** 
(0.232) 
- - 0.0913 
(0.167) 
- - 
lnCR8 lnVADD -0.438 
(0.649) 
- - -2.408*** 
(0.474) 
- - 
lnCR8 lnEMP -3.715*** 
(0.268) 
- - -2.841*** 
(0.198) 
- - 
lnCR8 lnINVEST 1.280*** 
(0.245) 
- - 1.641*** 
(0.214) 
- - 
lnCR8 lnCAP 2.862*** 
(0.262) 
- - 2.719*** 
(0.248) 
- - 
lnCR20  lnSHIP - -0.980*** 
(0.249) 
- - -0.0709 
(0.176) 
- 
lnCR20 lnVADD - 0.375 
(0.688) 
- - -2.068*** 
(0.485) 
- 
lnCR20 lnEMP - -3.890*** 
(0.281) 
- - -2.795*** 
(0.199) 
- 
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lnCR20 lnINVEST - 1.161*** 
(0.253) 
- - 1.583*** 
(0.216) 
- 
lnCR20 lnCAP - 2.716*** 
(0.267) 
- - 2.578*** 
(0.253) 
- 
lnCR50  lnSHIP - - -0.0785 
(0.101) 
- - -0.0394 
(0.116) 
lnCR50 lnVADD - - -0.696** 
(0.273) 
- - -1.317*** 
(0.317) 
lnCR50 lnEMP - - -1.528*** 
(0.121) 
- - -1.948*** 
(0.142) 
lnCR50 lnINVEST - - 0.877*** 
(0.132) 
- - 1.108*** 
(0.162) 
lnCR50 lnCAP - - 0.959*** 
(0.140) 
- - 1.617*** 
(0.177) 
Constant 5.915***  
(0.922) 
2.946* 
(1.650) 
-5.504*** 
(1.529) 
5.761*** 
(0.920) 
1.964 
(1.643) 
-1.873 
(2.323) 
Diagnostics 
Observations  11,756 11,718 11,756 11,756 11,718 11,718 
Facilities 2,177 2,177 2,177 2,177 2,177 2,177 
Years 6 6 6 6 6 6 
R-squared (within) 0.164 0.165 0.158 0.162 0.161 0.162 
F-statistic  153.74*** 
[0.000] 
153.80*** 
[0.000] 
146.29*** 
[0.000] 
205.88*** 
[0.000] 
204.35*** 
[0.0001] 
205.91*** 
[0.000] 
HW 31.04*** 
[0.000] 
24.91*** 
[0.0001] 
23.77*** 
[0.0006] 
31.33*** 
[0.000] 
26.18*** 
[0.0001] 
23.77*** 
[0.0002] 
W-T 238.951*** 
[0.0001] 
170.125*** 
[0.0002] 
199.510*** 
[0.0002] 
202.977*** 
[0.0001] 
162.978*** 
[0.0001] 
170.438*** 
[0.0002] 
Note: The market concentration variable is either the concentration ratio of the eight largest companies (CR8) in the sector (Model III), the twenty largest companies (CR20) in the sector (Model IV) or the fifty largest  
companies (CR50) in the sector (Model V). lnREL denotes the logged total (on-site and off-site) chemical releases. lnSHIP is the logged value of shipments. lnCR8 is the logged concentration ratio of the eight largest 
companies in the sector. lnCR20 is the logged concentration ratio of the twenty largest companies in the sector. lnCR50 is the logged concentration ratio of the fifty largest companies in the sector. lnVADD, is the natural 
logarithm of the total value added. LEMP denotes the logged value of total employment. lnINVEST stands for the total capital expenditure and lnCAP is the total real capital stock. W-T denotes the Wooldridge test for 
autocorrelation in panel data. The use of the fixed compared to random effects is justified after a Hausman test for each model. All models include state year fixed effects.Standard errors are in parentheses. To preserve 
space, we have deleted the results of the time dummies and their interactions with the threshold variables CR8, CR20 and CR50 respectively. The numbers in square brackets are the p-values. Significant at ***1%, **5% 
and *10% respectively. HW is the Huber/White test for groupwise heteroscedasticity. W-T is the Wooldridge test for autocorrelation in panel data.   
 
